Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

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名称	Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

索引号	F835.03/E991
分类号	F835.03 F83(金融、银行) F8(财政、金融) F(经济)
作者	Lippi、 Francesco、 1968-、
出版社	Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999.
ISBN
页数	viii, 162 p. ; 25 cm.
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